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This paper discusses fuel economy regulations in the United States and other countries. We first describe
how these programs affect the automobile market, including their impacts on fuel use and other dimensions
of the vehicle fleet. We then review different methodologies for assessing the costs of fuel economy
regulations and discuss what the results of these methodologies imply for policy. Following that, we
compare the welfare effects of fuel economy regulations to those of fuel taxes and assess whether
or not these two policies can be complements. Finally, we review arguments for transitioning away
from fuel economy regulations towards a “feebate” system.
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A number of countries now regulate the fuel economy of new, light-duty vehicles, while 
others regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) emission rates per mile, which is almost equivalent. There 
are two main economic rationales for these regulations. 
First, they require automakers to design more efficient vehicles or to shift sales toward 
more efficient models. This lowers CO2 emissions, reduces dependence on oil markets subject to 
economic and political uncertainty, and mitigates other externalities associated with petroleum 
consumption. Note, however, that these regulations are limited to improving fuel economy in 
new automobiles; they do not encourage other forms of conservation or affect other sectors. In 
contrast, direct taxes on oil or on carbon raise fuel prices for everyone. Thus, they promote fuel 
economy in new automobiles, discourage driving by owners of new and used vehicles alike, and 
reduce emissions and oil use beyond the automobile sector. In fact, automobiles account for 
“only” about 20 percent of CO2 emissions and 45 percent of oil use, both in the United States 
and worldwide (EIA 2009, IEA 2009). 
Second, fuel economy standards might address a market failure due to consumers 
misperceiving the benefits of improved energy efficiency. This rationale is controversial, 
however, because information dissemination programs may be a more efficient way to deal with 
consumers misperceiving benefits. Moreover, while a number of empirical studies find that 
consumers, in a variety of settings, appear not to pursue cost-effective opportunities to improve 
energy efficiency to the extent that they should, this is not a universal finding (e.g., Greene 2010, 
Helfand and Wolverton 2010). And even when consumers neglect apparently cost-effective 
opportunities, this behavior may only reflect unmeasured costs, rather than a market failure. 
But whether or not there is a strong efficiency rationale for fuel economy standards, the 
fact that they are widely implemented suggests they may be more politically tractable than other 
instruments. This fact raises a number of important policy questions that are taken up in this 
paper.  
We begin by discussing the structure of fuel economy standards in practice, their 
influence on fleet composition, driving, and other behaviors, and their historical and future 
effectiveness. We then review engineering and market-based approaches to measuring the costs 
of fuel economy programs. Next, we describe the overall welfare effects of fuel economy 
standards, comparing them to fuel taxes and assessing whether these two policies can  
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complement each other. Given that higher fuel taxes are widely believed to be politically 
infeasible in the United States, we also evaluate the case for replacing fuel economy regulations 
with “feebate” systems, which impose fees on inefficient vehicles and provide rebates for 
efficient vehicles according to their fuel consumption per mile. A final section summarizes our 
findings and concludes. 
Given the predominance of U.S. studies in the literature, and given that most other 
countries have only recently begun to implement similar policies, our discussion focuses largely 




Fuel Economy Standards and their Effects 
 
Policies in the U.S. 
In the U.S., the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program was introduced in 
1975 with the goal of reducing foreign oil dependence. Automakers were initially required to 
meet a sales-weighted average of 18 miles per gallon (mpg) for their car fleets, which increased 
steadily to 27.5 mpg by 1985. A lower standard was established for light trucks (pickups, 
minivans and sport utility vehicles or SUVs), which rose from 16 mpg in 1980 to 22.5 mpg in 
2008. The rationale for this lower standard was that trucks were primarily used by businesses and 
farmers, though this obviously is no longer the case. 
Following the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 and administrative 
action by the Obama Administration in 2009, standards will be aggressively tightened between 
2011 and 2016. In fact, there are now two separate regulations, one governing fuel economy 
issued by the National Traffic Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the other 
regulating CO2 emissions per mile issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The 
regulations are essentially equivalent, except that the slightly tighter EPA requirement allows 
automakers to earn compliance credits by modifying air-conditioner refrigerants to reduce 
greenhouse gases. EPA’s standard would yield a combined average fuel economy for new 
passenger vehicles of 35.5 mpg (250g CO2 per mile) in 2016, without the air conditioner credit, 
compared with a combined standard of about 25 mpg in 2008 (assuming no change in car vs.  
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truck sales shares). Automakers currently pay a fine of $55 per vehicle for every 1 mpg that their 
fleet average mpg falls short of the relevant standard, though presumably this fine will have to be 
increased to enforce the stricter standards. 
The structure of the CAFE program is also being radically reformed, though some details 
are still being finalized. Each vehicle will face a separate fuel economy target based on its size, 
or footprint.
1 There are separate mathematical functions for cars and light trucks, which map the 
footprints of individual models into fuel economy targets. These targets are then used to 
calculate sales-weighted standards for each automaker’s car and light-truck fleet. Automakers 
specializing in smaller vehicles will face more stringent standards, reducing incentives for 
automakers to downsize vehicles to comply with regulation. Other pending changes to the CAFE 
program include: expanding opportunities for automakers to bank and borrow fuel economy 
credits; allowing automakers to transfer credits between their car and light truck fleets; and 
allowing credit trading across firms. We discuss the implications of flexibility provisions toward 
the end of the paper. 
One looming issue (not pursued here) is how fuel economy standards might be adapted 
for electric and alternative-fuel vehicles, which promise to be growing parts of energy strategies 
around the world.
2 Accounting properly for vehicles that draw electricity from the grid, including 
plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles, is no easy task, since it requires attributing some level of 
emissions to electricity. These emissions depend on the fuel used to generate extra electricity, 
which varies greatly by location and time of day. As regards alternative fuels, the CAFE 
standards feature a loophole that treats flexible-fuel vehicles capable of burning either gasoline 
or ethanol as though they run on ethanol 50 percent of the time even though, in practice, these 
vehicles rarely use ethanol (Anderson and Sallee 2010). Although this loophole is scheduled to 
phase out by 2020, regulators still need to establish a way of measuring the true gasoline 
consumption or CO2 emissions of vehicles that use alternative fuels. 
 
                                                 
1 A vehicle’s footprint is its track width (distance between the centers of the left and right wheels) multiplied by its 
wheel base (distance between the front and rear axles). 
 
2 In part, these trends will be policy driven. For example, EISA strengthened the requirements for blending biofuels 
with gasoline. Low carbon fuel standards (recently introduced in California) will also encourage biofuels. There 
could be interesting interactions between these sorts of policies and fuel economy regulations that have yet to be 




Policies in Other Countries 
Figure 1 summarizes fuel economy standards in other countries with similar programs 
(for more details see An and Sauer 2004, Elmer and Fischer 2010 and IEA 2008). For example, 
in the E.U., average new vehicle fuel economy is set to reach 45 mpg in 2012 and continue rising 
thereafter, in response to regulations that set an ultimate target of 130g CO2 per km. Tighter 
standards are easier to meet in Europe, because high fuel taxes and the predominance of small 
cars and more fuel-efficient diesel engines, implies a higher baseline fuel economy. Unlike the 
U.S., which has separate standards for cars and trucks, the E.U. has one set of regulations for the 
entire light-duty fleet, but a so-called “limit value curve” allows heavier cars higher emissions 
than lighter cars while preserving the overall fleet average. The E.U. penalties for noncompliance 
are applied on a sliding scale through 2018, as part of the phase-in of the new regulations, with 
low penalties of €5 for the first g/km in excess of the standard, rising up to €95 for the fourth 
g/km in excess and beyond.  
China sets maximum fuel consumption standards for each vehicle, based on weight, 
rather than average fleetwide standards. Japan sets different fuel efficiency standards for diesel 
and gasoline vehicles, further differentiated by weight class. The future targets are based on the 
current “top runner” in each class (excluding niche products), but although the targets are 
mandatory, compliance seems to rely heavily on social pressures, as monetary penalties are low. 
Canada has modeled its fuel economy standards on those in the U.S., although the regulation is 
voluntary.  
Programs are also becoming more flexible in other countries. Examples are the 
movement toward weight-based standards in the E.U., Japan and China. The E.U. also allows 
pooling of targets across manufacturers to comply jointly with the standard and Japan allows 
manufacturers to accumulate credits in one weight category for use in another.  
 
Understanding How the Programs Work 
Predicting the effects of fuel economy programs is inherently difficult, given the 
complexity of new vehicle markets, which are best characterized as oligopolies.
3 Typically, firms 
offer a variety of models to the same consumer base. Thus, a firm that lowers the price on one of 
                                                 
3 The seven largest firms in the U.S. market in 2009 (General Motors, Toyota, Ford, Honda, Chrysler, Nissan and 




its models will reduce demand for its other models, while siphoning customers away from other 
firms. Besides price, automakers choose many physical attributes to bundle into a particular 
model. Market equilibrium is usually modeled as a Nash outcome, in which firms cannot 
profitably deviate by changing prices or vehicle attributes, given the choices of other firms (e.g., 
Austin and Dinan 2005, Bento et al. 2009, Jacobsen 2010a). 
If fuel economy programs are binding, they constrain a firm’s profit-maximizing choices 
by requiring that fleet average mpg exceed a minimum standard. Compliance strategies include 
altering vehicle characteristics—either by incorporating costly fuel-saving technologies or 
compromising other vehicle attributes, such as size and horsepower—or changing relative prices 
to increase the sales shares of more efficient models. Vehicle redesign is likely responsible for 
most improvements in fuel economy to date, since studies find that compliance costs are 
substantially lower in the long run, when automakers can redesign vehicles to be more efficient 
(e.g., Jacobsen 2010a, Klier and Linn 2008). 
Fuel economy regulations place an implicit tax on inefficient vehicles and changes in 
vehicle attributes that reduce fuel economy, while subsidizing efficient vehicles and changes that 
improve fuel economy. With separate standards for cars and light trucks, these taxes and 
subsidies operate separately within these two fleets, meaning that large cars are taxed while 
potentially less efficient small trucks are subsidized, creating a perverse incentive to re-design 
large cars as trucks (e.g., the Chevy HHR and Chrylser PT Cruiser).
4 Moreover, in the absence of 
provisions that allow credit trading between firms, there are no implicit taxes or subsidies on 
firms like Honda and Toyota that perennially exceed U.S. standards. This means that tighter 
standards may harm the competitive position of domestic U.S. automakers, while perversely 
allowing unconstrained foreign automakers to produce the large vehicles that domestic firms 
would have produced otherwise. 
Tighter fuel economy standards only affect new vehicles. Thus, when the standard 
increases, overall fuel economy improves gradually for about 15 years as new vehicles replace 
the old. By lowering fuel costs per mile, fuel economy standards also encourage more driving. 
Recent evidence for the United States suggests this “rebound effect” is fairly modest, however, 
                                                 
4 This increases an automaker’s average fuel economy for both fleets, since a re-designed vehicle would have fallen 
short of the car standard but exceeds the truck standard. Footprint-based standards will partially correct this perverse 




offsetting just 10 percent of the fuel savings resulting from higher fuel economy (e.g., Small and 
Van Dender 2007). Both the rebound effect and gradual turnover cause fuel taxation to be more 




The U.S. has the longest history with fuel economy regulation. Although it is not possible 
to make precise statements about the historical effects of CAFE, given the complexities 
described above and the difficulty of decomposing the effects of regulation from changing fuel 
prices and preferences for vehicle size, a few stylized facts are still clear. 
First, for most of its existence, CAFE has been binding. As indicated in Figure 2(a), 
actual fuel economy for new vehicles closely tracked the standard between 1978 and 2000, 
especially during the 1990s when the CAFE standards were unchanged.
5 Only during the run up 
in fuel prices in the 2000s were standards potentially non-binding.  
Second, while engine efficiency has improved during the last two decades, automakers 
have sacrificed potential improvements in fuel economy to make bigger, more powerful cars, 
presumably in response to perceived consumer preferences. Figure 2(b) shows the evolution of 
two key performance measures: (1) horsepower divided by weight and (2) time to accelerate to 
60 miles per hour. As fuel economy increased rapidly during the initial phase-in of CAFE 
standards, performance was flat. Then, for about 20 years, as CAFE standards and fuel economy 
both stabilized, automakers steadily improved performance. During that time, there were 
significant advances in fuel efficiency (in the sense of energy harnessed per gallon of fuel 
combustion), but the gains were allocated away from fuel economy (in the amount of fuel 
necessary to travel some distance), enabling bigger and faster vehicles to meet the CAFE 
requirements. 
Third, the share of light trucks in new vehicle sales increased from 3 percent in 1978 to 
about 50 percent in 2003, causing overall fuel economy for new vehicles to fall slightly during 
the 1990s (Figure 2(c)). A large part of this change was the advent of minivans, which replaced 
                                                 
5 This is consistent with the claims of the “Big Three” US automakers, who have argued that CAFE is binding and 
costly for them. Broadly, the Asian automakers have historically been well above the standard, while European 




station wagons, and then the rise of SUVs as family cars. Changes in consumer preferences are at 
least part of the explanation for the growth in light-truck sales, which preceded CAFE (Davis 
1999). The standards likely contributed to this transition, however, by creating incentives to 
design car-like vehicles to qualify as trucks.  
Less clear is the impact of fuel economy programs on road safety (e.g., Jacobsen 2010b). 
To the extent that it encouraged light truck sales, CAFE likely reduced traffic fatalities for the 
truck occupants that would have otherwise bought cars while increasing fatalities for everyone 
else (e.g., Li 2010, Gayer 2004). White (2004) finds that for each fatal crash that occupants of 
large vehicles avoid, over 4 additional fatal crashes involving others occur. On the other hand, 
for a given fleet mix, fuel economy regulations probably lead to smaller and lighter vehicles 
overall, which are less safe in single-vehicle collisions but can reduce injury risks to others in 
multi-vehicle collisions. Moreover, from an economic efficiency perspective, what matters are 
the overall external costs of traffic accidents, rather than highway fatalities. External costs 
exclude the risk of injuring oneself in an accident, but include injuries to others and third-party 
property damage, medical costs, and productivity losses. Based on available literature, it is 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the direction, let alone the magnitude, of the link 
between external accident costs and fuel economy regulations. 
 
Going Forward 
According to NHTSA (2010), automakers can meet future CAFE requirements with 
moderately costly technologies (e.g., cylinder deactivation, turbo-charging, engine down-sizing, 
conversion to dual-clutch transmissions, and start-stop engine technology), and other 
modifications (e.g., weight reductions), without causing a deterioration in power, acceleration, or 
other attributes. 
All else equal, raising average new vehicle fuel economy from 25 mpg to 35 mpg would 
reduce long run fuel consumption by about 30 percent. Disentangling the actual future effect of 
tighter standards is difficult, however, given that future fuel use would likely fall anyway 
(reducing the effect of the standards) with rising fuel prices, biofuel mandates, and a shift in sales 
back towards cars. Small (2010) considers a continued tightening of fuel economy regulations 
beyond 2016 that ultimately raises average new-vehicle fuel economy to 46 mpg by 2030. In this 
scenario, gasoline use falls 23 percent below 2010 levels by 2030, despite a projected 33 percent  
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increase in vehicle miles travelled over the period. However, at this point manufacturers are 
likely to run out of viable technologies and may prefer to pay fines in lieu of keeping in full 
compliance with CAFE, underscoring technological constraints on the potential for regulation to 
keep increasing fuel economy.  
 
 
Costs of Fuel Economy Policies 
 
There are two broad methodological approaches to assessing the costs of fuel economy 
standards (excluding their impacts on externalities). The engineering approach envisions 
automakers adding fuel-saving technologies to existing models, taking as given other vehicle 
attributes, such as power, and the size and composition of the new vehicle fleet. In contrast, the 
market modeling approach accounts for broader behavioral responses, including altering the 
sales mix of new vehicles and improving fuel economy at the expense of other attributes.  
 
Engineering Analyses 
In this approach (e.g., NRC 2002, Creyts et al. 2007, NHTSA 2010), upfront costs and 
per-mile fuel savings are assessed for a wide range of technologies. Automakers are assumed to 
progressively adopt the most cost-effective technologies to meet fuel economy requirements. 
Estimates of lifetime fuel savings are then subtracted from the technology adoption costs.
6 
NHTSA (2010) estimated that its new standard would add about $900 in incremental technology 
costs for the average new vehicle in 2016 but generate about $3,200 in fuel savings and other 
private benefits (e.g., reduced refueling time), implying a negative net private cost of about 
$2,300 per vehicle. Although NHTSA (2010) uses a relatively low social discount rate of 3 
percent, private costs are still negative even under a 7 percent rate. Note that we have defined 
benefits here to exclude externalities. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Pre-tax fuel prices should be used here, as savings in tax payments to motorists are offset by a revenue loss to the 
government. To the extent the rebound effect is included it plays a relatively minor role (leaving aside externalities) 




Controversies in the Engineering Approach 
This begs the question of why automakers have not already incorporated these seemingly 
profitable technologies. One possibility, put forward by NHTSA and others, is that consumers 
undervalue fuel economy benefits because of myopia, unreasonably short planning horizons, 
imperfect information, bounded rationality, limited salience of fuel costs in vehicle purchases, or 
simply their inability to calculate properly the financial benefits of energy efficiency. 
Skeptics of this “misperceptions” market failure see no reason why consumers should be 
systematically misinformed, not least because EPA fuel economy estimates must be prominently 
displayed on new vehicles. According to this view, various “unmeasured” costs (i.e., costs that 
are unobserved or ignored in engineering studies) account for any difference between the present 
discounted value of fuel savings and the cost of fuel-savings technologies. Were these 
unmeasured costs to be included, the argument goes, then the apparent net private benefit of 
tighter CAFE standards would disappear. 
Unmeasured costs might include costs associated with actually implementing new 
technologies, such as marketing, maintenance, and retraining mechanics. They also might 
include the opportunity costs of using emerging engine technologies to enhance fuel economy at 
the expense of competing vehicle attributes (such as horsepower or additional energy-using 
devices) that consumers value more highly (e.g., Austin and Dinan 2005, Fischer et al. 2007, 
Knittel 2009). A further unmeasured cost may arise if risk-averse consumers discount fuel 
economy benefits because they are uncertain about future fuel prices or actual fuel savings.
7  
Research on the “misperceptions” market failure hypothesis remains inconclusive. Lab 
experiments suggest that consumers are confused by the fact that cost savings are linear in 
gallons per mile—not miles per gallon, which is the standard way of reporting vehicle efficiency 
in the U.S. (e.g., Larrick and Soll 2008)—while qualitative surveys show that many consumers 
know little about the mpg of their current vehicles, their future mileage, and how to discount fuel 
savings (e.g., Turrentine and Kurani 2007). While these findings suggest that consumers 
inaccurately assess fuel economy benefits, the direction of any bias is unclear. Tests of market 
behavior provide a still murkier picture. For example, Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995) estimate 
implicit discount rates for new vehicle fuel economy of up to about 20 percent, which is broadly 
                                                 
7 Fuel economy ratings are inexact—a factor highlighted by the EPA’s recent overhaul of the rating system; 




consistent with estimated implicit discount rates for other energy durables (e.g., Hausman 1979, 
Dubin and McFadden 1984). However, the rate of a private automobile loan was around 10-15 
percent during their sample period, suggesting that high implicit discount rates may largely 
reflect borrowing costs. Given that credit markets for automobile loans are extensive and 
competitive, these high rates may simply reflect default risks, rather than any market failure. 
Another branch of the literature uses fuel price variation to test whether vehicle prices adjust by 
as much as predicted when consumers fully value fuel economy, but again the findings are very 
mixed (e.g., Kahn 1986, Kilian and Sims 2006, Allcott and Wozny 2009, Greene 2010, Helfand 
and Wolverton 2010). 
 
Market Modeling Approach 
Market modeling studies potentially address the limitations of engineering approaches, 
which ignore the impact of fuel economy standards on fleet size and composition and on other 
vehicle attributes, such as weight and power. 
Market modeling studies simulate the effects of CAFE regulations on gasoline 
consumption, automaker profits, and consumer welfare, using explicit models of the new vehicle 
market. Vehicle production costs typically depend on fuel economy, according to widely used 
technology cost assessments, such as NRC (2002), or possibly according to econometric 
estimates based on automaker behavior. Consumer demand functions for new vehicles are based 
either on detailed econometric models, in which household choices depend on prices and a range 
of vehicle attributes (e.g., Goldberg 1998, Gramlich 2009, Jacobsen 2010, Klier and Linn 2008), 
or on assumed own- and cross-price vehicle demand elasticities (e.g., Austin and Dinan 2005, 
Fischer et al. 2007, Goulder et al. 2009, Kleit 2004, Small 2010). Fuel economy improvements 
affect vehicle demand via the pass-through of technology adoption costs into prices, and through 
consumer preferences for fuel economy and other attributes. For tractability, most studies assume 
that automakers compete on prices in a Nash-Bertrand setting and that profits are maximized on 
a year-by-year basis. Most studies also model the rebound effect.
8 
 
                                                 
8 Anderson and Sallee (2010) do not model consumer and automaker behavior explicitly, but instead observe that 
automakers often fail to take full advantage of low-cost flexible-fuel credits in recent years, which provides an 




Given that studies differ considerably in their assumptions and methodologies, and that it 
is difficult to judge which models are the most reliable, we focus here on qualitative rather than 
quantitative results. 
First, in contrast to NHTSA (2010), virtually all recent market-modeling studies find that 
CAFE standards impose non-negligible costs on automakers and consumers. However, these 
studies rule out the consumer misperceptions hypothesis by assuming that the private market for 
fuel economy operates efficiently in the absence of CAFE standards.
9  
Second, short-run cost estimates for a small increase in the CAFE standard typically 
exceed long-run cost estimates by a factor of 2-3 (e.g., Klier and Linn 2008, Jacobsen 2010a). In 
the longer run automakers have greater scope for altering vehicle characteristics to meet a given 
standard, while in the very short run their only compliance option is altering the sales mix.  
Third, gasoline taxes are a far more cost effective policy because they exploit more 
margins of behavior for reducing gasoline use. Austin and Dinan (2005) and Jacobsen (2010a) 
estimate that CAFE standards are about 2-3 times more costly than a gasoline tax, for a given 
long-run reduction in fuel consumption. In Jacobsen’s (2010a) study, total welfare costs average 
about $2 per gallon of fuel saved for a 1 mpg increase in the CAFE standard, while a gasoline tax 
that saves the same amount of fuel imposes welfare costs of about $0.80 per gallon. The cost 
disadvantage of fuel economy standards is even more pronounced in the short run, as fuel taxes 
give all motorists an immediate incentive to save fuel by driving less, while new vehicle 
standards only permeate the vehicle fleet gradually. 
Finally, studies based on historical data may not provide reliable estimates of the future 
costs of fuel economy regulations. Cost estimates are sensitive to assumptions about baseline 
fuel economy (without policy) which can change substantially over time. For example, rising oil 
prices in the future, or progress on fuel-saving technologies, could shift baseline demand towards 
more efficient vehicles, thereby reducing the effectiveness and costs of a given fuel economy 
standard.  
   
 
                                                 
9 For example, Kleit (2004) and Austin and Dinan (2005) scale up the marginal cost of adding fuel-saving 
technologies (to proxy for hidden costs) until, in the observed baseline (i.e., prior to the CAFE policy), there are no 




The Welfare Effects of Standards and Fuel Taxes 
 
We now present a stylized model to assess the overall welfare effects of fuel taxes and 
fuel economy standards, accounting for externalities and possible “misperceptions” market 
failures. As we shall see, this model suggests that the efficiency basis for fuel economy standards 
is questionable, though we end our discussion with important caveats to this finding. 
 
Externality Rationale for Policy Intervention 
Suppose, for now, there are no misperceptions market failures. Consider Figure 3, which 
reproduces, based on the analysis developed by Parry et al. (2010), various marginal cost curves 
for reducing long-run gasoline use in the United States below a given baseline level. 
The grey solid curves indicate marginal costs if there were no externalities or pre-existing 
fuel policies. For the fuel tax, the area under this curve corresponds to the Harberger deadweight 
loss triangle created by the tax in the gasoline market. With a perfectly elastic fuel supply curve, 
the slope of the marginal cost depends on the long-run gasoline demand elasticity, taken to be -
0.4 (see e.g., Small and Van Dender 2007). The corresponding marginal cost for the fuel 
economy standard has a much steeper slope, given that this policy slightly increases (rather than 
reduces) vehicle use. 
  The dashed grey curves in Figure 3 take into account pre-existing fuel taxes, which are 
approximately 40 cents per gallon in the United States (combining state and federal taxes). For 
both policies, marginal costs now have an intercept equal to this prior tax, which reflects the 
initial wedge between demand and supply prices in the fuel market. That is, with no market 
failures, the existing tax would already cause motorists to overinvest in fuel economy and drive 
too little.  
  The solid black curves in Figure 3 net out externality benefits. For the sake of argument, 
given the contentious nature of global warming damages, we assume an external damage of $20 
per ton of CO2, or 18 cents per gallon of gasoline (e.g., Aldy et al. 2010, Newbold et al. 2009, 
Tol 2009, IWG 2010). Accounting for this benefit shifts down the marginal cost curves in Figure 




  Next, we net out the mileage-related externality effects. Parry et al. (2010) assume the 
following: marginal costs of traffic congestion, averaged across region and time of day, are 4.5 
cents per mile; the external costs of traffic accidents are 3.5 cents per mile; and local pollution 
emissions damages are 1.0 cents per mile.
10 At current on-road fuel economy in the United States 
(about 22 miles per gallon), these combined externalities would be equivalent to about $2 per 
gallon.  
However, mileage-related externalities do not fall in proportion to fuel use, because some 
of the tax-induced reduction comes from improved fuel economy. Assuming half the fuel 
reduction is from reduced driving implies an externality benefit amount of about $1 per gallon of 
fuel savings. Accounting for both fuel- and mileage-related externalities, the marginal cost for 
the fuel tax (the black curve) now has an intercept of about -80 cents per gallon. Marginal costs 
are negative up to a fuel reduction of about 10 percent, corresponding to the reduction implied by 
raising the fuel tax from its current level to its externality-correcting level (about $1.26 per 
gallon) at which point marginal costs intercept the horizontal axis.  
Under the fuel economy standard, mileage-related externalities increase, albeit 
moderately, through the rebound effect implying an upward shift in the marginal cost curve—in 
Figure 3(b) this curve has an intercept of 43 cents per gallon. Thus, standards are welfare 
reducing under the above assumptions about market failures. This finding would likely apply 
even more strongly to countries with much higher fuel taxes, particularly western European 
countries, as higher pre-existing fuel taxes shift up the (solid black) marginal cost curves in 
Figure 3.   
 
Misperceptions Rationale 
  There is, however, an additional source of welfare gain if lifetime fuel costs are not fully 
internalized by vehicle buyers. Parry et al. (2010) consider a bounding case for the potential 
magnitude of this market failure, where about two-thirds of the lifetime savings are not 
internalized—this corresponds to a case in which consumers take into account fuel savings over 
only the first three years of the life of a new vehicle. 
                                                 
10 Roughly speaking, local emissions vary with vehicle miles driven rather than total fuel use, that is, they are 
independent of vehicle fuel economy. This is because all new vehicles have to satisfy the same grams-per-mile 
standards, regardless of fuel economy, and these standards are approximately maintained throughout a vehicle’s life 




  The black dashed curves in Figure 3 show marginal costs, accounting for both 
externalities and this bounding case with misperceptions market failures. Under the fuel tax, the 
marginal cost is shifted downward even further to an intercept of approximately -$1.80 per 
gallon, and the optimal fuel tax increases to $3.25 per gallon. However, the downward shift in 
the marginal cost for the fuel economy standard is even greater, since all (rather than part) of a 
given fuel reduction under this policy comes from improved fuel economy. 
However in this model, the policy that maximizes economic efficiency does not include a 
fuel economy standard, despite the large misperceptions market failure. For a given fuel 
reduction, tightening the standard implies that more of the reduction will come from better fuel 
economy and less from reductions in vehicle miles traveled. Thus, with fuel economy standards, 
we are trading off one source of welfare gain (addressing misperceptions failures) for another 
(addressing mileage-related externalities). In the neighborhood of the optimal fuel tax, the first 
source of welfare gain falls (just) short of the second source of welfare loss. Moreover, higher 
values for CO2 (and any oil security benefit) is irrelevant to this finding, as this benefit is the 
same, regardless of how a given fuel reduction is achieved. That is, even with a high value for 
CO2 and a large misperceptions failure, it is still preferable to raise the fuel tax in this model, 
without a complementary increase in fuel economy standards.  
Accounting for fiscal considerations would seem to further strengthen the welfare basis 
for fuel taxes over standards. Gasoline appears to be a relatively weak substitute for leisure, 
which implies that (up to a point) swapping gasoline taxes for labor taxes (e.g., income and 
payroll taxes) will increase labor supply and generate additional welfare gains that are not 
possible under standards (West and Williams 2005, Parry 2007). Nonetheless, this presumes that 
the revenues from a gasoline tax are used efficiently, which is not guaranteed if revenues are 
instead earmarked for special interest projects rather than reducing distortionary taxes.    
 
Further Arguments for Regulation 
On further inspection however, the case for or against fuel economy regulation appears to 
be more nuanced. 
If other policies (e.g., peak-period pricing) were introduced to address congestion and 
other mileage-related externalities, the marginal cost under the fuel tax would shift upward, 
raising the likelihood that fuel economy standards would be part of the efficient policy. In fact, if  
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mileage-related externalities were fully internalized through other policies, it would then be 
optimal to address remaining market failures associated with fuel economy decisions through 
fuel economy policies rather than fuel taxes. 
Moreover, standards may be more practical than taxes. There appears to be less 
opposition from motorists to standards, given that they do not transfer a large amount of revenue 
to the government. Fuel taxes are also thought to be regressive, albeit moderately, and prior to 
use of revenues (Bento et al. 2009, West 2004, West and Williams 2004). In contrast standards 
may actually be progressive, as their direct impact is on new vehicles which are 
disproportionately consumed by higher-income families, though the issue is complicated because 
of secondary effects on used car prices via substitution between new and used vehicles (Jacobsen 
2010b). 
A third potential reason for regulation may relate to the imperfectly competitive nature of 
vehicle markets, in which a few large manufacturers are managing sales of large fleets of 
vehicles.  If fuel economy can be used as a means to segment consumers, price discrimination 
can be a motive for manufacturers to underprovide fuel economy to consumer types that value it 
less (e.g., large car buyers) and to overprovide it to those that value it more, in order to garner 
higher vehicle prices (Fischer 2005, 2010). However, while this kind of market failure can 
potentially motivate the use of minimum standards as a means of limiting the availability of 
price-discrimination mechanisms, average fuel economy standards like CAFE do little to address 
problems of excessive differentiation. 
For whatever reason, if the only practical option is standards, they can be welfare 
improving, with no misperceptions failure, under alternative CO2 damage assumptions—though 
greenhouse gas emissions damages would have to be well above 65 cents per gallon, or $72 per 
ton of CO2. Alternatively, the externality benefits from reducing oil dependence would need to 
be well above 22 cents per gallon. To the extent these externalities have been quantified, they 
appear to fall short of this threshold. For example, Brown and Huntington (2009) put the 
externality due to macroeconomic risks from exposure to oil price volatility at about 10 cents per 
gallon. More generally, there might be important national security or geo-political benefits from 
reducing reliance on imported oil from unstable regions, though these benefits are extremely 




Alternatively, given the bounding case for the misperceptions market failure, the above 
model  implies that to maximize economic efficiency it would be optimal to reduce long-run fuel 
use by 8.0 percent, given existing fuel taxes (Figure 3(b)). This would correspond, over the long 
run, to raising the average light-duty standard in the U.S. from about 25 mpg to about 27 mpg, 
well below the future standards now in law. As new fuel-saving technologies become available 
over time, however, baseline fuel economy would increase, thereby raising the appropriate 
stringency of the fuel economy standard.  
Furthermore, the regulations themselves may help to create a stable environment for the 
development and adoption of fuel-saving technologies with high upfront costs and long-term 
payoffs, and the welfare gains from induced innovation are not included in Figure 3. While a 
higher fuel tax would also provide incentives for innovation, the standard could provide more 
direct incentives by eliminating the downside risks to innovators from fuel price volatility and 
more precisely targeting domestic and international spillovers associated with fuel-saving 
technologies (e.g., Barla and Stef Proost 2010). In fact, inducing innovation over the long haul 
may be one of the most important objectives of regulation from a policymaker’s perspective.  
 
 
Standards versus Feebates 
 
There is growing interest in feebate policies that combine a fee for new vehicles with fuel 
economy below some specified “pivot point” with rebates for vehicles above the pivot point 
(e.g., Greene et al. 2005, Fischer 2008). Policymakers have been discussing feebates as an 
alternative to CAFE in the United States since the early 1990s, and feebates have already been 
implemented (in a modest form) in Ontario in 1991, and more recently in federal Canada and 
France. Like fuel economy regulations, feebates need not impose a politically unpopular tax 
burden on motorists. They can be made revenue neutral by setting the pivot point in one year 
slightly above the average fuel economy for new vehicles in the previous year.  
Under feebates, the tax or subsidy payment should be proportional to fuel consumption 
per mile (rather than fuel economy, in miles per gallon) to provide a constant incentive rate for 
each gallon of fuel saved, regardless of whether those improvements are in small or large 
vehicles. An increase of 1 mpg starting at a lower fuel economy rating has a larger impact on  
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gasoline consumption than a 1 mpg increase starting at a higher mpg, so if the payment schedule 
were instead based on mpg it would give a disproportionately small subsidy to fuel savings in 
low-mpg vehicles (where the potential for fuel economy improvements is greatest).
11 
Here we compare the cost effectiveness of various fuel economy policies and discuss to 
what extent they are compatible with other policy instruments.  
 
Cost Effectiveness 
  Within a given year, achieving an average fuel economy target for new vehicles at lowest 
industry-wide cost requires equating marginal compliance costs across automakers. Consider 
Figure 4 which shows marginal compliance costs (net of consumer willingness to pay for fuel 
economy improvements) for reducing fuel consumption per mile for representative high-cost and 
low-cost firms—for example, firms that specialize in large cars and small cars. The industry-
wide costs of meeting an average standard of  f  gallons per mile are minimized when the high-
cost and low-cost firms reduce fuel consumption per mile to  H f  and  L f  respectively (assuming 
firms have the same fleet size). 
  Under a traditional fuel economy (or vehicle CO2) standard, all firms are required to meet 
the same industry-wide standard, resulting in different marginal compliance costs. In terms of 
Figure 4, this would result in an efficiency loss indicated by the difference between the taller and 
shorter shaded trapezoids. Feebates automatically achieve the cost-minimizing outcome, in 
which high-cost firms pay a fee of τ on each unit between their actual fuel consumption per mile 
and the target level, while low-cost firms receive a subsidy of τ for each unit that their actual fuel 
consumption per mile exceeds the target level. Austin and Dinan (2005), for example, estimate 
that the total costs of complying with fuel economy targets would fall by a significant (though 
not dramatic) 15 percent with this equalization of marginal compliance costs across firms. 
However, the least-cost outcome could also be achieved under the regulatory approach by 
allowing limitless trading of credits among firms. In fact, in the United States and elsewhere, 
inter-firm trading provisions are being extended, undermining one of the key arguments in favor 
                                                 
11 In practice feebate systems have featured multiple pivot points as a way of lowering the tax burden paid, or 
subsidies received, by individual manufacturers. This system results in “tax notches”, where a marginal change in 
fuel economy can create a large, discrete change in tax treatment. Sallee and Slemrod (2010) find evidence that 
manufacturers respond to these incentives by slightly modifying vehicles close to cut-off points in the tax system, 




of feebates. Nonetheless, with a relatively small number of firms, the trading market could be 
thin with the risk that limited arbitrage will not be sufficient to equalize marginal compliance 
costs.
12  
  Another way to improve cost-effectiveness in the absence of credit trading is to set 
standards based on vehicle size or other attributes, which introduces variation in fuel economy 
requirements across firms that are potentially correlated with compliance costs. Still, in the 
absence of credit trading, the full equalization of marginal abatement costs will not be realized. 
Moreover, size-based standards blunt incentives for reducing vehicle size, which cuts off a 
potentially important option for improving fleet fuel economy.
13 Elmer and Fischer (2010) 
discuss how this problem could be avoided by allowing for automaker-specific targets based on 
historical (rather than current) fleet attributes. 
In a multi-period context, cost minimization also requires equating the marginal costs of 
compliance in one year with the (discounted) marginal costs of compliance in another. From a 
broader welfare perspective, this requirement presumes that the marginal external benefits of fuel 
reductions are the same over time, which is a fairly reasonable assumption, at least for CO2.  
Again, fuel economy programs in their traditional form violate this condition, as the 
marginal costs of complying with a fixed fuel economy standard will vary from year to year with 
volatility in fuel prices, which affect consumer willingness to pay for more efficient vehicles, and 
other factors. There is little evidence, however, on the extent to which this lack of flexibility over 
time might increase costs. Furthermore, recent provisions in the CAFE program are helping to 
deal with cost uncertainty, at least in part. Automakers are now allowed to bank CAFE credits 
for up to five years when they exceed the standard in a given year, and they may borrow credits 
if they fall short of the standard, so long as credits are paid back within three years. Perhaps more 
important is that technological innovation brings down costs of complying with a fixed fuel 
                                                 
12 In principle, feebates and standards with credit trading are equivalent instruments. The (uniform) price on fuel 
economy credits ensures that all vehicles face the same marginal incentive to improve fuel economy, playing the 
same role as the fee and rebate. In the regulatory approach, the industry-wide standard plays the same role as the 
pivot point fuel economy in the feebate system.  
 
13 The potential importance of downsizing as a means of improving fuel economy is clear from a comparison of the 





economy target, so marginal costs will not be equated over time unless the standard continually 
increases at an appropriate rate. 
Feebate programs can easily accommodate cost uncertainty and technical change. In 
periods of high compliance costs automakers can choose to pay more in fees, or forgo subsidies, 
enabling them to sell a greater share of vehicles with low fuel economy, and vice-versa in 
periods of low compliance costs. Feebates also provide ongoing incentives for improvement, as 
the value of fuel economy stays constant and does not diminish with technical advancements.  
Finally, while fuel economy standards naturally fall in the domain of the automakers, 
feebates could be applied either to automakers, dealers, or consumers. With efficient markets, the 
point of compliance should not matter, as the incentive should be passed along in the price of the 
vehicle regardless. Evidence in Busse et al. (2006) however, suggests that statutory incidence 
may matter: because of information asymmetries, the behavioral response to price incentives 
(such as feebates) may be stronger if they are levied at the consumer rather than producer level, 
with potential implications for cost effectiveness. This issue deserves further study. 
 
Compatibility with Other Policy Instruments 
While the gains from transitioning to feebates may not be that large on purely cost-
effectiveness grounds, given recent reforms to fuel economy programs,  an important drawback 
of standards is that they can undermine the performance of other, increasingly common, policy 
interventions in the transportation sector.  
For example, the U.S. provides generous tax credits for the purchase of hybrid vehicles. 
One of the primary objectives of these subsidies is to reduce CO2 emissions and dependence on 
oil. In the presence of binding fuel economy regulations, however, greater penetration of hybrid 
vehicles will simply allow automakers to cut back on fuel saving technologies for conventional 
gasoline vehicles (McConnell and Turrentine 2010). Similarly, taxes on vehicles with low fuel 
economy or high CO2 emissions may increase demand for smaller, more efficient vehicles, but 
therefore allow automakers to install fewer fuel-saving technologies than would otherwise be 
needed to meet the standard. To take another example, under a binding nationwide fuel economy 
program, a state or regional program that increases fuel economy in one area may be offset by 
reductions in other regions (Goulder et al. 2009). In fact, this concern recently motivated the  
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federal government in the United States to set standards equivalent to more aggressive standards 
already being phased in under California law. 
In contrast, pricing instruments tend to be additive. That is, hybrid vehicle subsidies and 
gas guzzler taxes will improve fuel economy and reduce gasoline use, regardless of pre-existing 
fuel taxes or the presence of feebates. Similarly, feebates at the national level would not 





The future effectiveness of fuel economy programs is difficult to gauge, given that the 
baseline fuel economy (in the absence of policy) is sensitive to oil prices, technology costs, and 
other factors. In addition, the cost-effectiveness of the standards remains contentious, due in 
particular to uncertainty about how consumers value fuel-saving benefits. At first glance, fuel 
economy regulations seem difficult to justify on welfare grounds, given that fuel taxes—even in 
the U.S.—exceed most estimates for per-gallon climate damages. In contrast, our stylized model 
suggests that high levels of fuel taxation can be defended—up to a point—on economic 
efficiency grounds, since they reduce congestion and other externalities that vary with miles 
driven and that are relatively large in magnitude. Even if there is a large market failure 
associated with consumers misperceiving the benefits of fuel economy, and even if the social 
costs of global warming or oil dependence are high, this need not imply a role for fuel economy 
regulations if fuel taxes can be adjusted. 
On the other hand, by revealed preference, standards seem to be more practicable than 
high fuel taxes for countries such as the U.S. Regulations may also help create a more stable 
environment for the development of clean technology by removing some of the downside risks to 
innovators in a world of uncertain fuel prices. Whether fuel economy regulations are better or 
better or worse than other instruments (e.g., technology prizes, fuel taxes, and fuel price floors) 
along this dimension, however, is not well understood.  
While the appropriate role of fuel economy regulations remains unsettled in the 
economics literature, recent structural reforms to existing programs, particularly provisions that 
expand opportunities for credit trading across firms, vehicle types, and over time, have helped to  
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improve the cost-effectiveness of the standards. Their relative lack of compatibility with other 
interventions in the vehicle market and at different levels of government remain a concern, 
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Figure 2. Trends in U.S. Fuel Economy and other Vehicle Characteristics 
 
 

















































































































































































Combined MPGFigure 3. Marginal Cost of Fuel Tax and Standards 
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